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The Epistemology of Anger in 
Argumentation1 
Moira Howes and Catherine Hundleby 
 
Abstract: While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and 
audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information 
about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that 
people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also 
enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of 
related inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an 
epistemic resource in argumentation. 
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Anger may be the enemy of reason. It cannot, all the 
same, come into being except where there is a place for 
reason.  
Seneca (De Ira, 21) 
 
When we turn from anger we turn from insight, saying 
we will accept only the designs already known, deadly 
and safely familiar. 
Audre Lorde (Sister Outsider, 131) 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, we provide a new view of the epistemic benefits of anger in 
argumentation. Drawing on research showing that anger can operate as a 
positive epistemic force, we chart paths for anger to assist people in achieving a 
clearer understanding of the content of arguments. We also suggest ways that 
anger can help reasoners – both participants in and observers of argument – to 
increase their accuracy in identifying the purposes argumentation serves. 
Attending to the complexity and significance of these functions of anger can 
benefit both arguers and arguments.  
We begin with an exploration of different accounts of ‘anger’ to set the 
parameters for our discussion. We address various arguments against the moral 
and epistemic influence of anger followed by arguments that show it can have 
moral and epistemic value. To support our view that anger has greater epistemic 
                                                        
1 This paper developed with the assistance of audiences at the Trent University Workshop on 
Emotion and Argumentation in 2016 and the Second European Conference on Argumentation: 
Argument and Inference in 2017. 
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value in argumentation than is often recognized, we draw on research in 
philosophy of emotion, moral psychology, psychology, and feminist studies. We 
explore the potential for emotion to support the epistemological functions of 
argumentation, suggesting that this contribution can be aided especially through 
what Douglas Walton (1992) describes as the “maieutic effect.” The maieutic 
effect concerns the way that argumentation processes – the exchange of reasons, 
questions, and responses – bring new ideas to light. In that way, argument 
functions like a midwife, he suggests, helping to birth “personal insights that 
deepen one’s understanding of one’s own position [on] an issue” (Walton 1992, 
220). The perspective that develops regarding oneself and the audience 
generates knowledge of the arguers, the context and functions of argumentation, 
and the world in which the arguers operate. In the case of anger, the maieutic 
effect extends to the very content of arguments, we suggest, insofar as it enables 
the identification of implicit reasons and assumptions. 
What Is Anger? 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle famously defines anger as “a desire accompanied by 
pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who 
have no call to slight oneself or one’s friends” (Aristotle 1984a, 1378a31-33). In 
this account, anger has a cognitive component consisting in the belief that one 
has been unjustly slighted and corresponding thoughts of revenge. Anger can 
also be calmed by a change in beliefs, such as when a person finds out that the 
one who made them angry did so involuntarily, or that they are “much distressed 
at what they have done” (Aristotle 1984a, 1380b32-33). Aristotle’s account also 
draws attention to the psychological and physiological feelings associated with 
anger. People find slights painful and take pleasure in the corresponding 
“expectation of revenge” (Aristotle 1984a, 1378a4). Anger thus has 
“compositional intricacy” for Aristotle, comprising “body and mind, cognition 
and desire, perception and feeling” (Price 2010, 140). 
The “compositional intricacy” of anger also appears in contemporary 
accounts. Although anger is considered to be one of six basic pan-cultural 
emotions (Ekman 1992) – and is thus arguably quite “hard-wired” in the human 
brain – anger is neither a clearly delineated natural kind nor does it have 
immunity to reason. Although anger often feels very automatic and resistant to 
rationality – features which suggest that anger is modular – there are excellent 
reasons to doubt that emotions are strongly modular in nature (De Sousa 2006; 
Russell 2006). Most contemporary accounts of emotion hold that emotions 
involve a complex blend of physiological responses, feelings, patterns of 
behavior, motivations, beliefs, perceptions, and judgements, which are amenable 
to change through rational influence (De Sousa 1987, 2010; Greenspan 1988; 
Griffiths 1997; Nussbaum 2001; 2016). Moreover, the interaction of anger with 
other feelings, emotions, desires, moods, thoughts, imaginings, beliefs, intentions, 
character traits, and various physical states makes for a great variety of possible 
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experiences of anger. Considering that the evolutionary purpose of anger likely 
relates to the need to signal the emergence of conflict that requires resolution 
(DiGiuseppe and Tafrate 2007, 16), and that conflict comes in many shapes and 
sizes, it makes sense that anger should be variable and flexible. Any account of 
anger in practical reasoning should therefore attend to various distinct forms of 
anger and their sensitivity to context.  
Another complication for any definition of anger arises from the need to 
distinguish between anger and its expression because the expression of anger 
does not provide a truly reliable guide to either the presence or intensity of 
anger (DiGiuseppe and Tafrate 2007). Anger can be expressed in very different 
ways; for example, it can be expressed through silence, stonewalling, glancing, 
shouting, passive aggression, physical violence, and even smiling. Our personal 
history and cultural context shape how we express anger, so such factors must 
also be taken into account (DiGiuseppe and Tafrate 2007). This variability of 
expression can make it challenging to identify anger or determine its degree in 
any given exchange or argument. 
To add further to the complexity of anger, Owen Flanagan (2018) 
identifies a variety of different types of anger. “Payback anger,” arises when 
people seek to harm those who have harmed them (Flanagan 2018, xvi). 
“Recognition respect anger,” seeks to restore personal status after a slight (xvi). 
“Pain-passing anger,” involves causing others pain because one is in pain, “but 
not pain that [they] caused” (xvi). “Instrumental anger,” involves the desire that 
others will provide a remedy (xvi). “Feigned anger” is used manipulatively to 
gain agreement (xvi). “Political or institutional anger” focuses on changing 
“social policies or laws or structures that are unfair, racist, sexist, or otherwise 
harmful and dehumanizing” (xvi). Finally, “impersonal anger” involves feelings of 
“horror and fury at the heavens, nature, human evil, or folly” (xvi). Flanagan 
further identifies three “spheres” of anger: the “personal” that comprises anger 
at “family and friends”; the “communal” that directs anger at “communal and 
commercial relations”; and the “political” that involves anger at “politics and 
institutions of government” (xvi). 
The complexity of anger surely provides a key reason for Aristotle’s care 
in addressing the difficulty of managing anger virtuously. In discussing moral 
excellence in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says, 
any one can get angry – that is easy – or give or spend money; but to do this to 
the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right aim, and in 
the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; that is why goodness is 
both rare and laudable and noble. (Aristotle 1984b, 1109a26-29) 
Aristotle thus places many conditions on anger for the virtuous person. In the 
Rhetoric he also addresses the conditions that give rise to calmness, for calmness 
is “the opposite of anger” (Aristotle 1984a, 1380a5-6). This is significant, as 
Flanagan notes, for Aristotle’s truly virtuous person is even-tempered and more 
inclined to forgiveness than revenge (Flanagan 2018, xvii). Given the constraints 
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Aristotle places on anger, and his view that virtuous people are gentle, occasions 
for virtuous anger presumably will be relatively uncommon. 
The Epistemic Case against Anger  
Anger has a well-established reputation for its negative effects on moral and 
interpersonal relationships as well as judgement, perception, and rationality. 
Everyday experience clearly shows that when people “see red” they often behave 
very poorly and appear to others as beyond the scope of rational persuasion. 
Skepticism about the moral and epistemic value of anger is therefore quite 
justified. Insofar as argumentation tends to be lauded for providing a reasonable 
alternative to violence and coercion, it is often taken to substitute reason for 
various emotional responses but especially for the anger that motivates 
retribution. Reason has provided one of the central means for managing or 
eliminating anger that philosophers have recommended throughout history and 
across cultures.  
Ancient Greek Stoics, for example, advise the elimination of anger, for in 
their view the beliefs and judgements that cause anger invariably prove 
wrongheaded upon later reflection. In later Roman Stoicism, Seneca similarly 
advises us to eliminate anger, for “it is easier to exclude the forces of ruin than to 
govern them, to deny them admission than to moderate them afterwards” (De 
Seneca 1995, 25, I, 7, 2-3). Similar approaches to anger also crop up in ancient 
and contemporary Buddhist philosophy. The Dhammapada, one of the texts of 
the Pali Canon, counsels that the wise person will control anger and respond 
instead with love. In a contemporary Buddhist context, Thich Nhat Hanh (2001) 
counsels us to respond to anger with compassion and search for and correct the 
ignorance and wrong perceptions at its root.  
Perhaps the most in depth contemporary western philosophical version of 
the view that anger always proves “normatively problematic, whether in the 
personal or public realm” comes from Martha Nussbaum (2016, 5). She reasons 
that anger always includes some notion of payback, although it may be very 
subtle. The payback sought through anger proves normatively problematic in 
two respects. First, even though the injured party may feel that payback will 
correct a moral harm, it will not. It is a mistake to think that “the suffering of the 
wrongdoer somehow restores, or contributes to restoring, the important thing 
that was damaged” (Nussbaum 2016, 5). Second, although payback may 
effectively improve our relative status after being wronged, Nussbaum argues 
that “it is normatively problematic to focus exclusively on relative status, and 
that type of obsessive narrowness, though common enough, is something we 
ought to discourage in both self and others” (Nussbaum 2016, 6). With regard to 
relative personal status, Nussbaum takes a Stoic approach: “if people are secure, 
they won’t see an injury as a diminishment” (Nussbaum 2016, 26).  
Although Nussbaum grants that anger may have some limited usefulness 
as a “signal to self and/or others that wrongdoing has taken place, as a source of 
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motivations to address it, and as a deterrent to others, discouraging their 
aggression” overall, she advises finding better routes to those goods (Nussbaum 
2016, 6). Anger can serve the practical purpose of protecting self-respect, 
identifying wrongdoing, and fighting injustice, but it remains normatively 
inappropriate. “Nor,” she says, “is it as useful, even in these roles, as it is 
sometimes taken to be” (Nussbaum 2016, 6). 
Anger can also constitute the enforcement of oppressive social structures, 
such as Kate Manne (2018) observes about misogyny, in which case it has a 
serious tendency to mislead people in their reasoning. Manne takes “misogyny’s 
primary function and constitutive manifestation [to be] the punishment of ‘bad’ 
women, and policing of women’s behavior” (Manne 2018, 192). Misogyny 
includes outrage at women though not necessarily hatred of women in general 
(an older view evincing some psychological naivety). Specific women become 
subject to misogyny, she suggests, when they deviate from nurturing roles and 
thus seem to wrong other people considered entitled to women’s support 
(Manne 2018, 90). The violation of these norms includes when women 
themselves seek support, and that demand to place a woman at the centre of the 
story can trigger misogyny against her (Manne 2018, 225, 236). “From the 
perspective of the dominant, the people they mistreat are often far from 
innocent. On the contrary, they are often tacitly – and falsely – held to be deeply 
guilty” (Manne 2018, 157).2 Insofar as people have no right to women’s caring 
labour, misogyny has no basis in truth, making misogynistic anger epistemically 
dysfunctional. Analogous obstacles to knowledge will arise regarding other axes 
of oppression, where anger responds to deviation from other sorts of 
subordinate roles. 
A considerable body of contemporary research in psychology seems to 
support the approach to anger we find in Manne, Nussbaum, the Stoics, and some 
Buddhist accounts. For instance, psychologists have found that anger can 
“dangerously alter perceptions of risk,” “distort likelihood estimates,” “place an 
attentional premium on anger-related information,” “decrease trust,” “increase 
stereotyping and prejudice,” and “trigger hostility and aggression” (Moons and 
Mackie 2007, 706). To argue that anger has a proper and rightful place in 
rational persuasion, at least as traditionally-conceived, thus seems to conflict 
with widely-held beliefs as well as some scientific evidence and liberatory 
politics. 
However, recognizing that people are susceptible to anger, and that anger 
may occasionally be “genuinely rational and normatively appropriate,” 
Nussbaum argues for a concept called “Transition-Anger, whose entire content is: 
‘How outrageous. Something should be done about that’” (Nussbaum 2016, 6). 
Transition-anger is “forward looking” in the sense that “a reasonable person 
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(Manne 2018, 229) or simply seek to maintain the social order. 
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shifts [from anger] toward more productive forward-looking thoughts, asking 
what can actually be done to increase either personal or social welfare” 
(Nussbaum 2016, 6). Nussbaum’s notion of transition-anger here resembles 
Emily McRae’s (2015) account of anger which draws on the Tantric Buddhist 
view that one can “metabolize” anger, that is, transform anger into morally 
efficacious “nourishment” that avoids destructiveness (McRae 2015, 466, 472). 
In metabolizing anger, one shifts the energy of the anger away from harm and 
towards helping oneself or others. McRae says that the “presence of an 
overarching deeply ingrained, caring orientation (bodhicitta) distinguishes 
tantric anger from normal anger” (McRae 2015, 474). 
The historical accounts of Stoics and Buddhists, and many contemporary 
accounts such as that of Nussbaum, make the case that people should eliminate 
anger because of the moral and epistemic havoc that it creates for individuals 
and communities. Nevertheless, Nussbaum’s transition-anger and McRae’s 
metabolized-anger suggest that anger need not be eliminated or repressed. 
Rather, it is what we do when anger arises that counts. And this raises a question 
regarding the extent to which these accounts really differ from Aristotle’s 
position that people can experience anger virtuously in select circumstances. 
Consider that Aristotle’s term for anger – orgê – has a more limited meaning than 
the Western concept of “anger,” referring only to “the species of revenge-desiring 
anger that comes from contempt, spite, and arrogant abuse” (Flanagan 2018, 
xvii). Given the downranking involved in these forms of slighting, Flanagan 
argues that orgê must depend on “cultural knowledge about status and hierarchy, 
about “who is not fit to slight one or one’s own”(Flanagan 2018, xvii). In his view, 
the intention behind the desire for revenge in Aristotle’s account is not to secure 
a bad consequence for the offender, but to reestablish one’s status or worth.   
Flanagan thus argues for the classification of Aristotle’s orgê as 
“recognition respect anger,” rather than as “payback anger” (Flanagan 2018, 
xviii). Recognition respect anger, like transition or metabolized anger, seeks to 
rectify a situation rather than engage in payback. As Trudy Govier argues, it 
seems that anger can operate without a desire for revenge (Govier 2002, 14). 
The idea that there may be constructive, virtuous uses of anger therefore seems 
quite plausible. 
It is also relevant that Aristotle’s discussion of anger in the Rhetoric takes 
place within a broader discussion of the character traits that inspire confidence 
in an orator, such as good sense, excellence, and goodwill (Aristotle 1984a, 
1378a9). These character traits are important for building trust with audiences 
and serve to moderate the influence of emotions on the judgements of orator and 
audience. This is important given that for Aristotle, emotions “are all those 
feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements” (Aristotle 1984a, 
1378a21-22). Aristotle begins his discussion of emotion and rhetoric with an 
examination of anger, which makes sense given the particular power of anger in 
oratory. Anger can easily sway an audience for good or ill and so knowing how to 
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ignite or calm anger provides an important oratory skill. Aristotle instructs that 
“we must discover what the state of mind of angry people is, who the people are 
with whom they usually get angry, and on what grounds they get angry with 
them” (Aristotle 1984a, 1378a24-26).  
It is our view that Aristotle’s instructions are worth greater consideration, 
for they reveal a good deal about the complexity of anger, its epistemic value, 
and its potential to enhance argumentation. While payback and pain-passing 
anger seem rather straightforwardly problematic both morally and epistemically, 
this is not clearly the case for recognition-respect anger, political anger, and 
instrumental anger. These angers do not necessarily involve the desire that bad 
consequences come to others and they may well begin at the ‘transition’ or 
‘metabolizing’ stage. The desire accompanying anger could, for example, be a 
strong desire for the peaceful resolution of an injustice.  
In light of the above considerations, to make the case that anger can have 
epistemic value in argumentation we focus principally on recognition respect 
anger, instrumental anger, and political and institutional anger, all of which 
involve goals beyond revenge. Also, because anger arises for complex social and 
cultural reasons and interconnects with many conscious, unconscious, and 
biological processes, we consider the door open for a broad interpretation of its 
nature. We are mindful that anger may well present differently in arguments 
depending on the ‘spheres’ it involves, and whether those spheres are distinct or 
overlapping. We consider anger to be more involved than a superficial reading of 
Aristotle’s revenge account at first suggests and hold that mistakes about anger’s 
value in argumentation, as well as the neglect of the topic in argumentation 
theory, trace in part to an overly simplified understanding of anger. This is an 
understanding we hope to correct as it applies to argumentation. 
The Epistemic Case for Anger 
At a basic level, anger has epistemic relevance because it arises in response to 
information about harm, frustration, or disrespect, and it ceases when the issue 
becomes resolved. The circumstances in which anger arises, however, are often 
quite complex and the cause of anger is not always immediately transparent. 
Additionally, the causes of anger arising from systemic and institutional injustice 
may be very difficult to identify from within those systems and institutions. 
Anger may thus resist resolution not because it is irrational, but because a 
reasoner failed to identify the correct source of the anger or determine the best 
way to address it. These pose significant considerations for any investigation 
into the epistemology of anger.  
Consider a case wherein a person provides a set of reasons for their beliefs 
that are rational and objective in light of what they have accepted about reality, 
but those beliefs clash with the emotion they experience. This discordant 
emotion then nags until a re-examination of the situation discovers that the 
emotion was ‘right’ all along. This type of experience leads Sabine Döring to 
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regard emotions as “an indispensable source of practical knowledge” (Döring 
2010, 283). She gives the example of Mark Twain’s character Huckleberry Finn 
who, acting on his sympathy for Jim, helps Jim to escape from slave hunters. In 
the novel, Huck’s sympathy does not align with his rational judgement that he 
should have turned Jim in. Only later does Huck realize that his sympathy – 
which persists all the while he believes he acted against his “rational” judgement 
– was right all along: it would have been wrong to turn in Jim.  
Examples like this show, Döring argues, that emotions have a “cognitive 
power” equivalent to reason and judgement that can guide people when they 
erroneously believe their reasoning is cogent. To serve this rational role, 
“emotions must be beyond the agent’s guidance and control” (Döring 2010, 297). 
That is, they must persist long enough for us to uncover their rationale and 
respond. The “ongoing cultivation of one’s practical reasons through discovering 
new reasons and improving one’s existing reasons” depends on emotions 
(Döring 2010, 296). On this view, anger provides a cognitive perception 
equivalent in its power with judgement and reason and is of a nature to persist 
until resolved. Anger in this sense functions rather like the epistemic feeling of 
doubt, which has a similarly persistent nature and drives us to seek resolution.  
Anger demonstrates epistemic value as it regularly signals for people that 
they are being harmed, devalued, or blocked in their objectives and persists until 
the problem is resolved. This provides some explanation for why work on social 
injustice, particularly gender and intersectional oppression, frequently 
demonstrates the epistemic value of anger (Adichie 2012; Burrow 2010; 
Campbell 1994; Cherry 2018; Donner 2002; Frye 1983; Gilligan 1990; hooks 
1996; Jaggar 1989; Leboeuf 2018; Lorde 1984; Lugones 1987; Manne 2018; 
McRae 2018; McWeeny 2010; Meyers 2004; Narayan 1988; Spelman 1989; 
Tessman 2005). As Audre Lorde argues, anger “is loaded with information and 
energy” and can be used for the “hard work of excavating honesty” about unjust 
personal, social, political, and institutional experiences (Lorde 1984, 127-128). 
Anger can also help people to increase their knowledge of personal agency, self-
worth, and oppressive structures, as well as provide epistemic resources for 
determining how to address problems that threaten their agency and worth 
(McWeeny 2010, 295-296). Without anger, reasoners are at greater risk of 
accepting false stereotypes and unjust treatment, particularly if it aligns with 
other false views about them in the cultural web of belief. Anger encourages the 
pursuit of truth. Anger can also help distinguish those with whom we can debate 
about differences from those “who are our genuine enemies” and will not take up 
our reasons or issues (Lorde 1984, 127).  
Anger can also improve people’s perception of the social and political 
world. Emotions like anger affect what reasoners pay attention to and can make 
previously unnoticed features of reality salient. Alison Jaggar argues that “outlaw 
emotions” such as anger can “enable us to perceive the world differently than we 
would from its portrayal in conventional descriptions. They may provide the first 
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indications that something is wrong with the way alleged facts have been 
constructed” (Jaggar 1989, 161). Maria Lugones argues further that anger can 
make travel possible between mainstream worlds where an “arrogant 
perception” structures the ignorance of “outsiders,” and worlds where “loving 
perception” makes power relations and their effects transparent (Lugones 1987, 
3, 18). As epistemic “world travellers,” oppressed reasoners can gain new 
understanding of the mainstream worlds and what they hide, as well as ideas for 
new possible worlds (Lugones 1987, 18). World travelers also learn more about 
their own subjectivity as they shift subjectivities between worlds.  
While anger can lead to knowledge of social injustice and its effects, those 
who are oppressed are less likely to have their anger taken seriously (see, for 
instance Manne 2018 on “himpathy”). This issue is not only moral, but also 
epistemic in nature. Kathryn Norlock, for example, argues that uptake from 
others and affirmation from audiences is necessary for gaining understanding 
through the expression of anger (Norlock 2009, 83). Anger also links, as Marilyn 
Frye argues, to recognizing that one has “a claim to a domain – a claim that one is 
a being whose purposes and activities require and create a web of objects, spaces, 
attitudes and interests that is worthy of respect, and that the topic of this anger 
is a matter rightly within that web” (Frye 1983, 87). For Frye, the expression of 
anger depends on certain social preconditions, and “requires and involves a 
certain cooperation from the other party… If the second party’s “uptake” is not 
forthcoming, the relation… collapses. Your speech just hangs there – 
embarrassed, unconsummated” (Frye 1983, 88-89). Anger is silenced and, as 
Myisha Cherry (2018) notes, that silencing constitutes a kind of epistemic 
injustice or violence that “disappears” knowledge (Spivak 1998; Dotson 2011). 
Rejecting the anger of others suppresses knowledge, “by making it the case that 
certain groups cannot be heard. Such ignorance can be harmful, for the angry 
agents’ courage or agency has now been undermined. This is an epistemic error 
made by the anger evaluator” (Cherry 2018, 60). 
The epistemic concerns associated with failures to acknowledge and 
consider the anger of others makes clear that anti-anger approaches to 
argumentation also carry significant moral risks. As McRae argues, it can be 
difficult to distinguish the “extirpation of anger from its repression or 
suppression” (McRae 2018, 109) and the extirpation of anger is very problematic 
for members of oppressed groups. She argues that because  
anger is at least in part communicative, happens in relationship, and requires 
some form of uptake, and since the uptake of oppressed people’s anger is 
routinely denied, oppressed people are faced with an extremely difficult 
psychological and moral task: How to abandon one’s anger with moral integrity 
in a society that did not take seriously one’s anger in the first place? (McRae 
2018, 109) 
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Given this, any theory of argumentation that does not recognize the constructive 
epistemological and moral value of anger in argumentation risks encouraging an 
oppressive standard that results in the loss of knowledge of the world.  
The view that anger has epistemic benefits for reasoning also receives 
support from an increasing body of research in psychology. Wesley Moons and 
Diane Mackie, for example, found that anger can enhance rather than detract 
from analytic information processing involving “effortful, deliberate, and 
meticulous scrutiny and evaluation of information” (Moons and Mackie 2007, 
706). They found that the responses of angry people and their actions can be 
“the result of quite clear-minded and deliberative processing” (Moons and 
Mackie 2007, 718). These findings counter the assumption that anger principally 
involves fast, nonanalytic forms of cognitive processing such as heuristics and 
stereotyping. In another study, Jimmy Calanchini, Moons, and Mackie (2016) 
found that persuasive appeals accompanied by expressions of anger increased 
analytic processing and helped override nonanalytic processing in the recipients. 
Recipients were also more likely to prefer strong arguments over weak 
arguments when anger was expressed. The authors theorize that because anger 
poses a threat, recipients are more likely to think deeply about persuasive 
appeals expressed with anger than they would otherwise. They also observe that 
emotions like anger “may signal that something is wrong in the environment and, 
consequently, motivate careful scrutiny” (Calanchini, Moons, and Mackie 2016, 
89). 
Anger has also been found beneficial for reaching compromises during 
negotiation, provided that negotiations are taking place in a context with low 
levels of hatred. Eran Halperin and colleagues (2011) found that inducing anger 
in groups with low levels of hatred towards an outgroup resulted in increased 
levels of support for reaching compromises with that outgroup. They also note 
that anger can contribute to improved intergroup relations, increased awareness 
of out-group heterogeneity, long-term reconciliation, and risk taking in 
negotiations (Halperin et al. 2011, 284). By contrast, inducing anger in groups 
with a high level of hatred towards an outgroup reduces support for reaching a 
compromise. These studies suggest that some of the negative effects on moral 
and epistemic value that people normally attribute to anger may actually stem 
from hatred.  
Anger in Argumentation Theory 
These various considerations about anger convince us of its epistemological 
value and lead us to consider how it affects reasoning that takes place in 
argumentation. If arguing practices can help arguers to use anger wisely, they 
might limit anger’s disruption of reasoning processes and contribute to greater 
learning through argumentation. The dialogical contexts that include the 
expression of anger cannot be adequately captured by the monological model of 
an argument as a premise-inference-conclusion complex, and we find helpful the 
The Epistemology of Anger in Argumentation 
239 
dialogical account of “argument” as “an invitation to an inference” proposed by 
Robert C. Pinto (2001). When one offers an argument, there may be a hope to 
persuade the audience, but there may be other goals for the proposed inference 
too. The larger discursive context in which people argue, the dialectical models, 
and the rhetorical techniques people use all belong under the term 
“argumentation.” Sometimes an occurrence or a piece of dialogical 
argumentation may be called an “argument” too, and such segments of 
argumentation can include premise-inference-conclusion complexes. 
Our main claims are that anger can serve the operation of reasoning in 
argumentation and that argumentation provides useful ways to process anger. 
To support these claims, we first review some of the treatments of emotion in 
argumentation theory. Theorists such as Michael Gilbert, Dale Hample, and 
Douglas Walton have noted positive roles that emotions play in argumentation. 
While they have not focused on anger and or particularly recognized its 
epistemological potential, their accounts suggest how the role of anger in 
argumentation might be better understood. We then focus specifically on anger 
in argumentation, and show that anger, properly managed, may be of 
considerable value to argumentation, since epistemological values such as truth, 
empirical accuracy, and understanding often figure among the express purposes 
for arguing. Even when the main purpose of arguing does not lie in determining 
the truth or the most justified belief, argumentation tends to have a maieutic 
effect. That may result from a focus on content that distinguishes argumentation 
stylistically from other forms of discourse: “[e]ven when the primary interaction 
goals are identity, dominance, or something other than issue resolution, the 
conversation plays out in terms of content” (Hample 2012, 165). Focusing on 
content involves the critical doubt that Walton suggests moves argumentation 
forward, and that movement can draw out the meaning in anger and allow 
arguers to learn from it. 
Emotion in Argumentation 
Argumentation helps us to address disagreement, whether understood in the 
minimal sense of reluctance to accept a claim or as a stronger opposition such as 
taking up a contrary position. Traditionally argumentation theorists treat 
disagreement and strong opposition as strictly logical relations between claims 
or propositional viewpoints, neglecting the likelihood of attendant personal 
conflict. Isolating disagreement by addressing only the logical opposition 
certainly can simplify the processes of argumentation in order to make people’s 
goals more attainable. Sometimes people want to bracket off the complexities of 
social relationships to progress on one particular point of contention, a focus 
that the complexity of emotion and the forcefulness of anger can undermine. 
Much can be missed, however, in argumentation that assumes all relevant 
information has been made explicit. Moreover, although the expression of 
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emotion can conflict with the goals of argumentation, it can also provide 
information relevant to sorting out and achieving those goals. 
Late twentieth century scholarship on persuasion tends to treat emotions 
in general as weapons, not elements of communication deserving respect. 
Emotion was mostly ignored or treated only as an impediment to reasoned 
argumentation and a source of skepticism because the historical study of 
argumentation focused on written texts and speeches. Even since the 1970s 
surge of interest in interpersonal argument, studies tend to set emotional 
aspects aside (Hample 2012). 
Yet, emotions account for multiple dimensions of argumentation. As 
Hample explains: 
Emotions contextualize arguments, instigate them, disguise them, interpret 
them, guide them, and resolve them. The understanding of what people are 
doing when they argue is probably more traceable to feelings about arguments 
than to any amount of formalized knowledge about them. (Hample 2012, 174) 
To ignore emotion in argument, Gilbert advises, is “to forget that one is arguing 
with a human being” (Gilbert 1997b). To ignore this in actual arguments or in 
argumentation scholarship (a tendency he calls “neo-logicism”) sacrifices the 
potential for rich communication that encourages “a deep understanding of 
mutual positions and standpoints” (Gilbert 1997b).  
What attention there has been to the role of emotions in argumentative 
reasoning focuses largely on fallacies and associated argumentation schemes. 
Because emotional appeals have such force, they can play too great a role in 
argumentation and may gain an undeserved weight in reasoning, thus 
constituting fallacies. Walton associates four argumentation schemes with 
emotion: ad baculum or appeal to force, ad populum or appeal to popular 
sentiment, ad misericordiam or appeal to pity, and ad hominem or personal 
attack. Each of the four, Walton (1992) suggests, relies on what the arguer takes 
to be deeply held emotional commitments of the audience, especially 
commitments to their own personal interests. As for other fallacies, an appeal to 
emotion derives credibility from invoking an accepted inferential scheme in 
these cases playing to personal interest (Walton 2010). Any scheme can be 
invoked in the wrong place or the wrong fashion in an unreparable way 
deserving to be diagnosed as a fallacy. 
However, the audience’s personal agendas can be perfectly reasonable 
bases for argumentative appeal, enhancing the salience of the reasoning offered. 
Each argumentation scheme associated with the fallacy name can be acceptable 
in certain circumstances. In the case of ad baculum, the type of dialogue, 
“negotiation,” circumscribes the appropriateness of the appeal, but the other 
schemes typical of “persuasion” dialogue may tend to become fallacious even 
within dialogue type. Showing that a claim or emotion has relevance to the 
specific persuasion dialogue depends on supporting premises particular to a 
type of appeal, and requires that the arguer address questions regarding that 
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support: In ad populum, might the received view track the truth? In ad 
misericordiam, is sympathy relevant to evaluating a student’s grade? In ad 
hominem, do a person’s failings affect the validity of their claims? Generally, do 
those emotionally loaded observations relate significantly to the matter under 
discussion? Do they deserve as much attention as they receive? 
When knowledge provides a goal for argumentation then emotional 
appeals provide room for skepticism, but Walton’s account of presumptive 
argumentation schemes shows that appeals to emotion can play positive roles in 
argumentative reasoning too. He presents the proper function of argumentation 
schemes as depending on a dialogical context that has specific purposes, such as 
resolving disagreement in “persuasion” dialogue or “critical discourse,” or in 
planning to exchange resources in negotiation dialogue. For instance, the ad 
baculum argument, characterized by an appeal to force, threat, or fear, can be 
appropriate in negotiation dialogue but not in persuasion dialogue, because of 
their different value orientations. In negotiation dialogue matters of truth and 
falsity play a secondary role, and the main purpose lies in the exchange of some 
kind of goods or items of value, including personal actions and behaviour. Ad 
baculum appeals have no place, however, in persuasion dialogue, which includes 
pragma-dialectical “critical discussion” in which people use argument to resolve 
disagreement. Walton’s persuasion dialogue involves disagreement, but it may 
succeed even without resolving that disagreement so long as the process has a 
maieutic effect and those involved learn something about their background 
assumptions (Walton 1998, 30-31, 48-49).  
Emotions take on a more extensive and broadly valuable role in Gilbert’s 
multi-modal approach to argumentation that can be used to analyze any 
argument. The emotional mode of analysis that he recognizes operates alongside 
the logical mode for viewing argumentation, well developed over centuries by 
scholars, along with two further wholly or partly non-logical modes, namely the 
visceral and kisceral modes. Gilbert associates the emotional mode broadly with 
feelings, the visceral mode with physical and contextual elements, and the 
kisceral mode with spiritual and intuitive concerns. Some expressions in one 
mode may translate into others while others may not be translatable. Many 
arguments will reflect more than one mode, and “an argument, then, may be 
wholly or partially in a particular mode when its claim, data, warrant, and/or 
backing is drawn from that particular mode” (Gilbert 1997a, 80). 
Gilbert’s multi-modal account makes especial sense in his coalescent 
model of argumentation, which measures the success of an argument in terms of 
the development of mutual understanding. Each mode provides a different kind 
of strength to an argument and may in fact dominate the function of the 
argument so much that some arguments fall into types distinguished by modes. 
There can thus be emotional arguments in which the emotional mode dominates 
(Gilbert 1997a, 93-99).  
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The modes of arguing, however, are not the same as the goals of argument 
that Gilbert also recognizes to fall into different types. “Task goals” form the 
immediate strategic object of the encounter whereas “face goals” concern the 
relationship among participants, including their continued engagement in the 
argument. Each influences the other and, further, both types can be affected by 
an individual person’s psychological motives that overarch and guide strategic 
and face goals (Gilbert 1997a, 67-68). Such goals, however, need not be explicit 
to have an influence on argumentation: 
Goals can be hidden from the person who holds them. We can be unknowingly 
self-destructive or self-defeating. We can be provocative or antagonistic 
without realizing that we are trying to evoke a particular reaction. We can think 
we are doing one thing for one reason only to realize later, with or without help, 
that we were completely wrong. (Gilbert 1997a, 69) 
Bringing into awareness one’s own goals and those of others in the argument 
thus provides a central technique of “coalescent argumentation.” The 
development of understanding about goals helps to draw people into agreement 
by conjoining their positions in as many ways as possible and finding common 
ground (Gilbert 1997a, 70-71). Gilbert also suggests that nondiscursive 
communications – gestures, tone, emphasis, and so on – clarify and disambiguate 
verbal or logical communication and thereby support meaning (Gilbert 2001, 
244).  
Whatever the ideal or real goals of argumentation, expressed emotions 
help us understand the intentions of arguers as the maieutic effect brings “light” 
to what Walton describes as “dark-side” commitments or beliefs. Dark-side 
commitments of one person are not clear to that person (or to others), and the 
probative operations of argumentation bring them into the discussion in a way 
that constitutes the maieutic effect (Walton 1992, 220). As an argument 
proceeds, arguers become more aware of the content of their beliefs and the 
implications of what they say. The demands of explicitness, which acts as a virtue 
of argumentation, make arguers less able to remain unconscious of our beliefs 
and commitments (Govier 1999). The maieutic effect may even help reasoners to 
confront cognitive biases (Walton 1998). Walton suggests that emotion provides 
the direction and critical doubt provides the mechanism for the progress of 
argumentative discussion. 
Walton (1992, 1998) indicates that others can only recognize dark-side 
commitments and make them “light-side” commitments by using empathy. 
Arguers use such empathy to aid the effectiveness of speculation about what 
reasons might persuade the other person.  
The basis of all persuasive argumentation lies in the choice of suitable initial 
premises for convincing your respondent through your ability to put yourself 
inside your opponent’s position in an argument, metaphorically speaking – it is 
the ability to arrive at presumptive conclusions, concerning your respondent’s 
commitments in a dialogue. It is based on presumption because, 
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characteristically, you do not have any direct way of knowing what your 
respondent’s commitments really are in an argumentative exchange. (Walton 
1992, 255) 
A truly persuasive argument must attend to matters deeper than those made 
explicit.  
Further, Walton echoes the pragma-dialectical school of argumentation 
theory in viewing critical doubt as an attitude that involves suspension of one’s 
own views in order to take others’ views seriously. While critical doubt may 
seem dispassionate, Walton (1992) suggests it engages empathy, or at least 
creates conditions conducive to empathy, and this can initiate the unpacking of 
expressed emotions. 
Anger in Argumentation 
Anger may be the emotion that most obstructs the progress of reasoning in 
argumentation, giving good reason to be skeptical about arguments involving 
anger. Anger’s ability to undermine efforts at shared reasoning seems to outstrip 
any particular fallacy, which may explain why most argumentation theorists 
ignore it. Yet, we maintain that anger can in particular circumstances help 
argumentation better fulfill its expressive, persuasive, and epistemic functions, 
and it can help us to identify the goals of argument and evaluate their 
importance. After all, argument may have no definitive purpose (Goodwin 2007). 
The central goals for an argument might not include epistemic values such as 
empirical adequacy, knowledge, truth, or understanding. But even in cases 
where the goals of argument are not obviously epistemic, we contend that the 
maieutic effect of argumentation manifests the epistemological value of anger.  
People strongly associate anger with argumentation. In empirical studies 
anger connects with disagreement (Hample 2012) and both laypeople and 
argumentation theorists tend to take resolving disagreement to be the point of 
arguing. The strongest association lies in popular parlance where ‘to argue’ 
means to have a verbal fight, such fights often involving anger. Argumentation 
theorists generally count verbal fights as an ‘eristic’ form of argument, which 
specifies the goals of winning. Who wins may be assessed by public favour, or 
successfully inflicting injury on the other person. Epistemological goals such as 
knowledge or advancing understanding are not typical, and even when present 
in eristics they will be secondary to winning. Daniel H. Cohen observes that the 
irony of eristic argumentation lies in the “loser” learning the most, and so 
“winning” but in different terms (Cohen 2013; 2003). “It is odd, to say the least, 
that someone who has become convinced of something in an argument – that is, 
someone who has gained a new, well-justified and battle-tested belief – is 
invariably described as the ‘loser’ of the argument!” (Cohen 2003, 2)  
Most disagreement involves opposition not just to claims but to people or 
their actions, whether or not those people are among the arguers. Disagreement 
often sparks anger and can encourage further clashes as the discussion proceeds. 
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Hample notes that “[w]hen the other is personal, aggressive, and rude, an arguer 
is pressured to respond in kind” (Hample 2012, 138). He explains that this cycle 
may be less effective for people with certain social identities, such as women, 
and people with certain character traits, such as low argumentativeness or low 
verbal aggression.  
Communicated anger, regarding some secondary concern, may drag 
impersonal and only logically opposed positions into emotional territory. Anger 
can be expressed without a clear object, in which case it can confuse the 
intended meaning and further escalate the disagreement. The expression of 
anger suggests an attribution of blame – just as blame motivates anger, so does 
anger motivate blame (Lerner, Goldberg and Tetlock 1998). While the anger 
itself may be clear, the direction for the blame and the implication of audience 
may not be so clear. Whether that anger regards a wrong to oneself or to others, 
its presence can distract arguers from their primary goals. It can build a 
disagreement into a fight and may detract from the need to consider the quality 
of reasons. Whether the fight emerges as physical or remains verbal and 
becomes a quarrel, the disagreement can become too personal and 
comprehensively oppositional or even eristic. As Walton argues, “[b]ias and 
other categories of critical evaluation of argumentation mean little in the quarrel. 
Argumentation in the quarrel is, by its nature, always strongly biased towards 
one's own side, and against the point of view of the other side” (Walton 1991, 6). 
The personal quality of anger puts others off and prevents them from listening, a 
definite epistemic problem. Anger can indicate single-mindedness in the arguer 
and engender the same single-mindedness in the audience. It can create a 
slippery slope into mutual dogmatic antagonism. 
Any emotion can be strategically expressed, and it can sometimes swamp 
other emotional dynamics (Hample 2012). Because so many aspects of anger can 
be unpleasant and even painful, anger thus can be employed as a weapon. People 
don’t wish to be the object of others’ anger and so may walk away from 
arguments that involve it.  
The expression of anger can make the other person fearful, and so it may 
constitute an argument ad baculum, and feigned anger can be used to manipulate 
audiences. The desire to harm or injure typifies the quarrel dialogue in Walton’s 
account:  
The quarrel is typically precipitated by a trivial incident that “sparks” an 
escalation of emotions, with both parties adopting a stubborn or “childish” 
attitude… The real purpose of the quarrel is a cathartic release of deeply held 
emotions so that previously unarticulated feelings can be brought to the surface 
– feelings that would not be appropriate to bring out for discussion in the 
course of a normal, polite, public conversation. (Walton 1992, 21)3 
                                                        
3 What counts as politeness may affect the need for such a style of argument dialogue. While 
the contrast of emotional expression with politeness may be more culturally bound and 
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The purpose of emotional release proves problematic when other types of 
dialogue become diverted into quarrel and people end up in a battle instead of in 
an exercise of mutual persuasion or inquiry into the facts of a matter. Walton 
(2007) suggests that a shift from critical discussion to quarrel will never be 
acceptable because a quarrel cannot efficiently achieve the goals of critical 
discussion. We might demur that shifting to quarrel can be acceptable (imagine 
someone responding, “all right then, let’s have it out!”). Yet such a shift will 
certainly pose problems in changing the priorities of the argument and anger can 
certainly spur that movement toward quarrel.  
These effects of anger seem to indicate overwhelming problems for 
argumentation. However, the strong connection between anger and argument 
suggests that the relationship cannot be wholly dysfunctional. Anger can inspire 
argumentation, inviting others to make inferences and gain understanding, and it 
can anchor and feed how processes of expression, investigation, and learning 
operate in argumentation. In any dialogical context of argument including the 
quarrel, we suggest, anger can alert us to the presence of hidden premises and 
motivate us to make reasons explicit. Anger can provide us with content 
knowledge of other people’s beliefs and also with information about their level 
of commitment to these beliefs, the relationships among the person’s beliefs and 
values, and the depth of disagreement among arguers. 
People may express anger through gestures, timing, and other non-explicit 
means or make anger a direct subject for argumentation. Consider, “I don’t want 
to go see that movie about climate change as it will make me angry.” This 
straightforward appeal to undesirable consequences constitute a practical 
consideration and a move in negotiation that employs an acceptable form of ad 
baculum. 
Such emotional knowledge about a person can be valuable for showing 
their reasons to others and making an inference ‘inviting.’ Gilbert argues that 
“[e]motions expressed during argument provide information that can play a 
crucial role in determining the acceptability of a premiss. Someone exhibiting 
anger or sadness when uttering a premiss indicates the degree to which the 
premiss is important, the role it plays in the argument, or a reaction to a received 
message” (Gilbert 2004, 252). The expressed passion itself – in addition to the 
content that can be teased out of it – serves the persuasive functions of argument. 
Walton recognizes this too: “Detachment from emotions is not always a good 
thing in argumentation. In many instances, in order to make a convincing case, it 
is important to show a passionate conviction” (Walton 1992, 268). Gilbert’s view 
retains a strength over Walton’s view on this matter, however, in recognizing 
that displays of passionate conviction can convey epistemically relevant content. 
                                                                                                                                           
gendered than Walton recognizes, we consider it important that he acknowledges both the 
role of emotion in starting ‘the quarrel’ and the role of ‘the quarrel’ in helping people process 
emotion. 
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For arguers who desire to persuade in argumentation, expressing anger 
can help their audiences to recognize the inference intended by the arguer and 
the coherence of the arguer’s claim with their deeper orientation to values and 
facts about the world that provide the basis for the inference. Expressing anger 
can help previously ignored, suppressed, or unseen information become salient. 
Anger can encourage inference by providing information about premises, biases, 
goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that might otherwise remain 
implicit or be prematurely dismissed.  
The information about the arguer that anger conveys includes that 
person’s moral sensibilities, values, and judgements. All these help us to trace 
the arguer’s inferences and understand the background considerations that 
warrant those inferences. Arguers can learn about their own and each other’s 
reasoning even when they fail to persuade each other, fail to negotiate an 
exchange, or fail to find out the truth of the central matter. The sorts of things we 
can learn from anger in argumentation include the revelation of social biases 
operating as hidden premises and implicit assumptions. Anger’s communication 
about values and expectations can provide an opportunity to make injustice 
explicit.  
Whether express or implicit, insofar as anger can function as a 
psychological defense mechanism, it can serve as a sign of other mental states 
and psychological needs. For example, anger can protect reasoners from painful 
emotions such as shame, guilt, rejection, and hurt, as a ‘cover-up’ emotion or 
defensive reaction. It can also prevent people from experiencing feelings of 
vulnerability, which people may want to avoid given that they can be painful and 
frightening (Pascual-Leone et al. 2013; Seltzer 2013) Anger may quite literally 
provide a measure of pain relief: norepinephrine, one of the key hormones 
released in anger, has analgesic effects. The righteousness of anger may thus 
help us to avoid painful feelings as well as taking genuine responsibility for our 
feelings, actions, and reactions. Anger may also serve as “a socially acceptable 
mask for many of the more difficult underlying emotions we feel” (Brown 2012, 
34). 
These findings suggest that the most epistemically interesting 
propositional or factual content in anger belongs actually to the emotions 
underlying the anger. Arguers can therefore learn a great deal about the implicit 
content of an argument through consideration of emotions associated with angry 
responses, such as hurt, shame, embarrassment, grief, or fear. The informational 
content belonging specifically to anger may in some cases be secondary and 
involve ideas about wrongdoing or defensive or offensive reactions focused on 
redress. Because anger draws attention away from any underlying emotions that 
may be in play, it can hide content having moral, psychological and 
epistemological significance that argumentation helps to reveal. Arguers, 
however, may need to exercise caution before digging into that deeper 
argumentative content if anger is serving a protective function. 
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Discovering what anger conceals and identifying the defensive and 
offensive maneuvers involved comes from recognizing anger as expression or 
communication. Whether anger seems to be a protective ‘cover-up’ emotion or a 
defensive communicative reaction, it connects a complex array of interpersonal 
factors, not to mention beliefs and assumptions about how others should behave 
and what they should think. The display of anger can show conviction, 
frustration, determination, and moral orientation in a way that exceeds the 
content of specific factual claims and provides a holistic picture of the person 
expressing the anger. Anger often expresses more than cognitive states and 
propositional content. 
Walton and Gilbert more than any other argumentation scholars stress the 
value of unearthing the background beliefs and goals of arguers and accept the 
role of emotion in this regard. Walton suggests that “the critical function of 
argumentation can act as a corrective or balance to the steering function of 
emotions” (Walton 1995, 257). This process appears less antagonistic and more 
constructively complementary when Walton describes the rules and procedures 
of discussion shaping feelings into a form that allows them to be articulated to 
oneself and to others in a way that grounds the maieutic effect (Walton 1995, 
258). Walton suggests specifically that argumentation allows hidden grievances 
to be “expressed explicitly in order to make possible the smooth continuance of a 
personal relationship” (Walton 1995, 109). Sharing emotions on his pragmatic 
account therefore seems to serve what Gilbert describes as “face goals” at the 
same time as serving the “task goals” of expressing feelings and articulating 
grievances. Anger can foster certain moral virtues in the context of a dispute, 
including face goals such as the cementing of friendship and community, at least 
in the context of long-term relationships where grievances need resolution 
(Walton 1992, 202).  
Even in the case of quarrels, anger may have epistemic potential. Walton 
(1998) only recognizes that the quarrel serves to “air” disagreements and “bring 
them to the surface.” Expression and articulation presented this way provide at 
most a neutralizing or cathartic effect rather than a positive contribution to 
reasoning because quarrels operate primarily in what Gilbert calls the emotional 
mode. Yet Walton hints at some of the epistemological benefits we have in mind 
when he discusses how quarrels serve the face goals of building interpersonal 
relationships. 
By allowing powerful feelings to be expressed through the articulation of 
deeply held grievances, the quarrel can improve mutual understanding and 
cement the bonds of a personal relationship. A quarrel can split two people 
apart, but if it has a good cathartic effect, it can function as a substitute for 
physical fighting and draw people closer together in the course of a meaningful 
relationship. (Walton 1992, 22) 
The mention of understanding here suggests that epistemological benefits can be 
part of a quarrel’s mechanisms. Quarrels can help us realize what other people 
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consider important (Walton 1995), which may benefit from how anger can make 
strong arguments persuasive and motivate attentive listening, as we saw above 
from psychology.  
Quarrels can also help people understand themselves better because as 
arguers they strain to articulate values, concerns, and commitments. Walton 
points out that “[h]eeding your emotions in argumentation can, in general, be a 
good guide to keeping in harmony with your deepest, fundamental commitments, 
which define your personal stance or considered judgement as an individual” 
(Walton 1992, 257). 
Understanding another person’s motivations and one’s own as they unfold 
in arguments or other discourse has value in itself, we suggest. The expression of 
anger provides a moral response to another person or situation, giving 
information about the arguer as a person experiencing offense, and about the 
object of the anger. The target of the anger may not be the audience, but other 
people, institutions, and situations, and the expression may serve to bond people 
who share the anger or sense of injustice. As Lorde observes, “[p]art of my anger 
is always libation for my fallen sisters” (Lorde 1984, 129). In such a case, the 
anger carries information about the world and wrongs experienced there. 
Part of the strategic value of anger in argument lies in providing a global 
perspective on oneself that can help the other person understand where the 
priorities lie that shape the arguer’s viewpoint. Understanding others has 
epistemic value in itself, but there is more to be said about the value of taking 
others seriously. It can require believing what people say, acknowledging the 
validity of their experience, and thus cultivating their epistemic and 
argumentative agency (Bondy 2010; Fricker 2007; Dotson 2011; Townley 2009; 
2011). The epistemic dimensions of this process also occasionally arouse anger, 
such as when epistemic norms are violated in the course of argument or when 
reasoners believe that epistemic goals are subverted through falsity or 
insufficient evidence. Taking others seriously and having empathy need not 
require agreeing with others’ judgements or accepting the blame attributed. 
Sometimes disagreement, even angry disagreement, can be a sign that arguers 
are engaging other’s views fully, showing epistemic and moral respect – and 
indeed, in some cultural contexts, failing to show anger can signal disrespect and 
dismissal of the issues at hand (Schiffrin 1984). 
While we suggest that anger can point to certain truths about beliefs, goals, 
and values, Gilbert argues (2004, 250) that the evaluation of the emotional 
message in an argument does not involve its truth but whether it is genuine or 
counterfeit. He allows there are strong parallels between emotional and 
propositional content. In both cases, argumentative assessment includes: (1) is it 
being sent correctly? (2) is it being received correctly? (3) is it true (genuine)? 
and, (4) is the inference of suppressed premises or unexpressed emotions 
justified? (Gilbert 2004, 251) These criteria for assessing the relevance of 
emotional considerations run parallel to those for assessing the relevance of 
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premises or claims: emotions may be exaggerated or emphasized appropriately 
or inappropriately, just like facts; and are equally subject to assessment via 
argumentation (Gilbert 2004, 252-256). Sara Ahmed also advises that anger not 
be treated as a “site of truth” (Ahmed 2010). Emotions may be feigned or 
stressed appropriately or inappropriately, just like facts (Gilbert 2004, 252-256). 
We would add that they can also be misunderstood, perhaps more than most 
argumentative content.  
Gilbert and Ahmed need to account, however, for how emotions cohere or 
clash with what gets articulated in the logical mode of truths and falsehoods. 
Gilbert recognizes that the emotional and logical mode can conflict and that such 
opposition can be assessed using certain inferential principles (Gilbert 2001). 
Should the audience identify dissonance between the information signaled by 
emotions and the explicit content of an argument, he argues they may assume 
that an implicit emotional factor played a significant role. The audience may 
assess that an arguer’s logically articulated commitments do not reflect their 
true perspective, and so the emotional information trumps prior considerations. 
“In that case, one must turn to non-logical techniques relying upon the tools 
human communicators normally use when interacting” (Gilbert 2001, 240). The 
emotional information thus can prove more veridical than the logical. Should 
there appear no conflict, then reasoners can integrate emotional information as 
truths into the contents of our understanding – not an easy task, but an 
epistemologically valuable one. 
The epistemological value of anger in argumentation depends therefore on 
the operation of critical doubt and that is radically different from the skeptical 
doubt that the expression of anger can also prompt. Critical doubt propels the 
progress of reason in argumentation and can help us to recognize anger’s 
epistemological potential, prompting us to ask questions about the significance 
of anger and its role in the arguer’s reasoning. Yet critical doubt involves passion 
too: empathy for the angry person. To recommend such empathy, however, does 
not extend sympathy to misogynists or other people ‘punching down’ in policing 
oppressive hierarchies. That response would reinforce the ignorance on which 
the arrogant perception depends (Lugones 1987; Manne 2018). So, Manne 
advises that here the “liberal impulse is therefore misplaced… unless we want to 
get stuck feeding the need monster forever” (Manne 2018, 290). The anger that 
protects privilege involves entitlement, and that does not interface with critical 
doubt in the way necessary for significant epistemological value.  
Conclusion 
The complexity of anger includes different forms dependent both on how it 
arises and on various directions it takes towards a person or other object. 
Attending to this complexity is important, for while there are reasons to be 
skeptical about the ability of anger to contribute epistemically to argumentation, 
some of these reasons are rooted in an overly simplistic and monolithic view of 
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anger. We contend that certain forms of anger, such as recognition respect, 
political, and institutional anger, have goals beyond revenge and are able to 
contribute more to argumentation epistemically than is generally appreciated. 
On this view, anger can improve argument analysis, enhance critical doubt, and 
emphasize the salience of premises by signaling their relative importance. Anger 
can motivate arguers to travel empathetically between different positions and 
the various subjectivities and worldviews that accompany them. Anger can bring 
into awareness the goals of argument for different arguers and thereby promote 
increased understanding and conflict resolution. Anger can also signal the 
presence of implicit premises and contextual factors and motivate us to identify 
and address them.  
For these reasons, it is important to regard anger as a source of potential 
epistemic value in argumentation and commit to the work of using anger to 
excavate knowledge and insight. While anger can be painful, awkward, and 
challenging to work with, there are ways to manage anger skillfully so that its 
maieutic benefits are realized, and its more harmful aspects are minimized. 
When reasoners direct anger not toward others in the conversation or even to 
their ideas, but rather toward a shared concern, anger can even inspire the 
collaborative building of arguments and relationships. Given the possibilities 
that this new approach to anger in argumentation presents, epistemologists and 
argumentation researchers have much to explore regarding how anger operates 
in specific forms of argumentation and different dialogical contexts.  
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